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Abstract
In this work, a fragile watermarking method based on incomplete cryptography for
copyright protection is proposed. Our proposed method solves the original content
leakage problem of the conventional digital rights management (DRM) system, that is,
the original contents are temporarily disclosed inside the user’s system. We include the
fragile watermarking into the encryption and the decryption of the digital content
distribution system via network. Our method can easily control the quality of original
content in order to generate the scrambled content for trial before purchasing. Then,
when the watermarked content is generated, the user information is simultaneously
embedded into the scrambled content. Experimental results with simulation
confirmed that our proposed method is successfully applied on the standard JPEG
format and it seems to be suitable for real applications.
Keywords: Digital rights management (DRM); Digital images; Copyright protection;
Incomplete cryptography; Invisible watermarking
Background
Overview
Since growth of computers and network technology, digital contents are easily manip-
ulated by everyone based on the image/video software. Therefore, illegal copying and
distribution of contents via Internet has become a serious problem. Thus, the need for an
effective rights management system where only legitimate consumers can have access to
digital content, is required recently.
By the traditional protection way, encryption techniques play the role of the first defense
method (Shi and Bhargava 1998; Sun et al. 2006; Wen et al. 2002; Xu et al. 2004; Zhu
et al. 2005). However, the content after decryption can be redistributed without the per-
mission. It causes illegal distribution even by the legal users. Therefore, the multimedia
watermarking and fingerprinting are the potential solutions to the problem (Cox et al.
1999; Katzenbeisser and Petitcolas 2000; Lu et al. 2006a; Wu et al. 2003) by providing
passive protection.
Multimedia fingerprinting techniques (Boneh and Shaw 1998; Trappe et al. 2003; Wu
et al. 2003; Zhao and Liu 2006) are developed to deal with the illegal redistribution
problem. Before transmitting digital content from the content producer to the legal users,
a digital fingerprint should have already been embedded into the content. For different
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users, the corresponding different fingerprints would be embedded into digital content.
Once a user illegally redistributes the digital content, the embedded digital fingerprint
can be detected to reveal the traitor.
Digital rights management (DRM) systems are created to protect and preserve the
owner’s property right. A DRM system usually contains encryption, key management,
legal access control, and identification of legal user process. To prove the authorized
digital content, the watermarking is usually embedded into the content without the
knowledge of users. The identification and tracing can be used to follow the source of
pirated copies by using the watermarking/fingerprinting (Emmanuel and Kankanhalli
2003; Hartung and Ramme 2000; Kirovski et al. 2001; Lin et al. 2005; Seki and Kameyama
2003).
Related works
Currently, previous DRM solutions usually use four technologies in its process such as
encryption, digital signature, digital watermarking, and fingerprinting (Hsu and Hou
2005; Lu and Liao 2003; Lu et al. 2006b; Tzeng et al. 2005; Wang and Chen 2007; Wang
and Lin 2004; Zeng and Liu 1999).
In our understanding, the conventional DRM system (server-side encryption and
user-side fingerprint embedding) was first proposed in Macq and Quisquater (1995).
Then, it was extended by Bloom (2003) and Hartung and Girod (1997). In the
method of Macq and Quisquater (1995), one global key-based encryption is needed
to encode the original content at the server side. The encoded content can be sent
to many users via network by multicasting. At the user side, the encoded content
can be decrypted according to the global key. After that, a watermarked software
(DRM controller software) is necessary for joint multimedia decryption and finger-
print embedding according to user’s information. However, the watermarked software
is still an open problem because the original content is possibly revealed inside the sys-
tem by this software (the original content leakage problem) Lin et al. (2012). Therefore,
users can save original contents without watermark information and distribute it via
network.
In order to solve the original content leakage problem, Karthik and Hatzinakos (2007)
proposed a joint fingerprinting and decryption (JFD) method. JFD employs the un-
decrypted parts imitate multimedia fingerprint embedding in the decoding process. By
using JFD, original content is not disclosed temporarily inside a systemwhile decoding the
content. However, the un-decrypted parts are the cause of distortion of digital content.
With the similar motivation, Chameleon method was proposed by Anderson and
Manifavas (1997) based on secret table look up operations. In this scenario, the fin-
gerprinted contents are decrypted for different users using different secure tables.
Therefore, the Chameleon method can distinguish different users by checking the
fingerprint for each secure table. However, the Chameleon method may consume
greater bandwidth because each user needs a different secure table as the mention in
Lian (2008).
With the different idea, Lin et al. (2012) proposed the fingerprinting method and user
side using vector quantization domain (FVQ). FVQ employed the permutation and code-
word substitution tables using static key-trees or dynamic key-trees. It seems it can
save significant bandwidth and conveniently update key-trees. However, in the FVQ
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scheme, there is not trial content for users to try it before deciding whether to purchase
or not.
To solve the original content leakage problem and to provide the trial content for users
via network, our previous work (Thanh and Iwakiri 2014) employs the Huffman feature
to implement the DRM system on a JPEG image. However, the amount of the embedding
information is needed to improve in real applications.
Our contributions
In this paper, we describe a design and implementation of DRM technique based on
an incomplete cryptography system. The know-how of the proposed method is the
fundamental incomplete cryptography. Our method will degrade the quality of orig-
inal contents to make the trial contents for delivering users via network. The qual-
ity of trial contents will be controlled with a watermarked key at the incomplete
decoding process, and the user information will be embedded into the incomplete
decoded contents simultaneously. We also join the watermarking process and decoding
process to improve the problem of traditional DRM system of the original content leak-
age. Based on our method, we can control the quality of the decoded content according
to the watermarked key.
In this study, the robustness of watermarking method is not considered. We only con-
centrate to solve the problem of a conventional DRM system which is to completely
disclose the original content inside a user’s system while decoding process. We combine
two processes (decoding and watermarking) at the user side to become the incomplete
decoding. The user’s information is embedded into the decoded content simultaneously.
Assuming that there are not any attacks on the decoded content, we always identify
exactly the legal user by extracting the userID from the decoded content. From this idea,
we make the following contributions in this paper:
1. We propose the fundamental incomplete cryptography which differs from
complete cryptography (e.g., DES, AES, ...). It is promising to be able to solve the
problem of conventional DRM system.
2. We present a new fragile fingerprinting method that includes trial contents for
advertisement and userID for distinguishing the legal user. Our system makes it
easier for users to try the digital content before purchasing.
3. Our proposed method can detect the source of pirated content by comparing the
extracted userID from the incomplete decoded content with producer’s database.
It is considered that it can limit the illegal redistribution in advance.
Roadmap
This paper is organized as follows. The scheme of the proposed incomplete cryptography
system is presented in the “Overview of incomplete cryptography” section. The imple-
mentation of digital content distribution system based on incomplete cryptography is
explained in the “Implementation of digital content distribution system” section. The
“Methods” section presents the algorithm of incomplete cryptography on the Joint Pho-
tographic Experts Group (JPEG) image. The experimental results with JPEG images are
given in the “Results and discussion” section and the conclusion is summarized in the
“Conclusions” section.
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Overview of incomplete cryptography
The proposed incomplete cryptography for DRM systems is explained in this section.
There are two steps in the proposed cryptography: the incomplete encoding and the
incomplete decoding. The basic idea of the incomplete cryptography is shown in Fig. 1.
Incomplete encoding
Producer T has a digital content P and needs to create an encoded content by the incom-
plete cryptography. In that case, P will be encoded based on the encoder function E with
the encoder key k to make the scrambled content C.
C = E(k,P) (1)
In the incomplete cryptography, C can be simply recognized as a part of P (even if C is
not decoded) . This feature is called incomplete confidentiality. T can distribute C widely
to users as trial content via network.
Incomplete decoding
The incomplete decoding process is different from the complete decoding process.
Decoded content is created by another decryption function D′ with another decoded key
k′i(i = 1, 2, ..., n). Note that, D′ with k′i is different from D with k, where D is the decoded
function that can decode C to obtain P. The decoded content P′i is calculated as follows:
P′i = D′(k′i ,C) (2)
In this case, because P′i is decoded by another decryption function D′ with key k′i , it will
be different from original content P. Therefore, the relationship of P and P′i is P′i = P in
incomplete cryptography system. Hence, this decoder process is quite different from the
complete cryptography. This feature is called incomplete decode.
According to features of incomplete cryptography, if a set of the decoded keys k′i with
decoder function D′ to decode a encoded C are chosen, a set of decoder contents P′i will
be created and different from each other. So, if incomplete cryptography is implemented
to construct a distribution system via network, the producer can distinguish the legal user
by P′i that is decoded based on key k′i .
Fig. 1 Overview basic idea of incomplete cryptography
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Implementation of digital content distribution system
We use the features of the incomplete cryptography for construction of the digital con-
tent distribution system. The incomplete cryptography is used to create the scrambled
content (as trial content). The fragile watermarking is performed by using the incomplete
cryptography.
Scrambled content
If the incomplete confidentiality characteristic of the incomplete cryptography is used, it
is possible to make the scrambled content. The scrambled contents are used as trial con-
tents, which are delivered to users via network. The scrambled contents has an important
role in a user’s decision of purchasing.
The basic idea of the scrambled algorithm is shown in Fig. 2(a). Suppose P is a content
in the domain of original contents, k is an encoder key, and E is an encoder function. E
will encode a part of P and degrade the quality of P. For instance, if a producer wants to
make a scrambled picture C from P, he or she can use E to encode lower bits plane of
pixels. The method of scrambled process is to use simultaneously for all pixels, and each
pixel takes a different value. Therefore, the quality of P is degraded.
In the incomplete cryptography, an encoded part can be selected adaptively from many
elements in digital content, so that a producer can prepare various scrambled contents to
distribute via network as the trial contents. After selecting the part to encode, the formula
(1) is used to create the scrambled content.
Fig. 2 DRM system based on incomplete cryptography (a, b)
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Generation of watermarked key
In order to generate the watermarked key, T needs the user information that is registered
by user Ri. The user information wm may be userID, user’s name, birthday, and so on.
Using the key generation function G, T can create the watermarked key k′i based on k, P
and wm,
k′i = G(k,P,wm) (3)
In our work, we suppose that the watermarked key is delivered to users by safe way such
as CD and USB. Therefore, the watermarked key is individually sent to a user and it is not
tampered by any attackers.
Watermarked content
In the proposed method, the decoded content P′i is different from the original content P.
Assume that a user Ri can decode C to obtain P′i that closes to the quality of P, then we
can propose a watermark algorithm to control quality of P′i. The watermarked algorithm
is explained as follows (see Fig. 2(b)):
Suppose a user Ri receives a decoder key k′i from T and decodes scrambled C. Here, if
k′i = k, it is clear that P′i = P. However, as shown in Fig. 2(b), if the quality of P′i is sufficient
for the user, even if k′i = k, user cannot notice the distortion of P after the watermark
embedding is applied.
Thus, T can control the quality of P′i (watermarked contents) with a particular key k′i
(watermarked key). Then, when the user decodes C using k′i to make P′i, P′i is not only
decoded with slight deterioration, but also watermarked with particular information (i.e.,
user information). It is the elemental mechanism of fragile watermarking based on the
incomplete cryptography system.
Assuming that one legal user redistributed the watermarked content to illegal user,
it is difficult to trace the redistributed source without user’s information. Therefore,
when a producer wishes to check whether the user is a legal user, he/she can extract
the watermarking information from P′i and compare with his/her user database. If the
watermarking information matches his database, the user is a legal user. Conversely, if
the watermarking information is different from his database, the user is an illegal user.
Furthermore, it can specify to trace the source of pirated copies. The purpose of this pro-
posed method is to inform the producer about the existence of watermarking which can
exactly identify users, and to limit the illegal redistribution in advance.
Methods
In this section, an algorithm which is applied to JPEG image (International Telecommu-
nication Union 1992) is explained. The scrambled image and the watermarked image are
generated based on the incomplete cryptography.
Summary of JPEG algorithm
Images subjected to JPEG encoding are first broken down into 8 × 8 blocks. Next, each
block is put through the discrete cosine transform (DCT), then the DCT coefficients
are quantized into integers using a quantization table, and finally entropy encoding is
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performed. In general, the spectrum of the image is biased toward the lower range, and
as a result, the DCT coefficients in higher ranges are often set to zero as a result of quan-
tization. The last step in this process is to compress these coefficients using Huffman
encoding.
In case of JPEG, image information is kept inside the data file as a quantized DCT
coefficient and quantization table. On the other hand, various parameters such as the
quantization table coefficients, and side information, which are necessary to decode the
picture, are recorded in the frame header. Quantized DCT coefficients are stored in
the DCT tables (8 × 8) by zigzag scanning, where the DC coefficient is the value of
the top-left corner ((0,0) coefficient). The remaining 63 coefficients are called the AC
coefficients. The quantized DCT coefficients, which are neighborhood of the DC coef-
ficient, are low-frequency coefficients, and the others correspond to the high-frequency
coefficients. Because the high-frequency coefficients in 8 × 8 block often become “0”
after quantization, the spectrum of picture tends to be constructed with low-frequency
coefficients.
Our proposedmethods
To make the scrambled contents and the incomplete decoding contents of JPEG, we
have selected the quantized DCT coefficients to implement the incomplete cryptogra-
phy. There are two reasons for choosing of the DCT coefficients. The first one is that
it is easy to control the quality of the JPEG image. The second one is that it is flexible
by selecting a luminance component (Y component) or two chrominance components
(UV component) in the quantized DCT coefficients in order to implement our proposed
method.
Additionally, in order to compare the efficiency of the above components, we alter the
DCT quantization table to control the quality of the JPEG image based on the Y coefficient
and UV coefficient. There are two types of a DCT quantization table such as the table for
the UV component and the table for Y component. In each quantization table, there are
64 quantized coefficients. If we alter these quantization tables, we can easily control the
quality of digital content with low computational cost.
Figure 3 describes the overview of our proposed system. First, the Huffman decoder
is performed and the DCT tables or DCT quantization tables (Q-tables) are obtained.
Then, we apply the proposed lower bits scramble method (LBSM) to create the scrambled
content (trial content). The decoding key of an individual user is generated based on the
function G by using userID. In order to decode the trial content, the Huffman decoder
is performed and then the DCT tables and Q-tables are decoded by the proposed fragile
decryption and watermarking combination (FDWC). In this process, the userID is also
embedded into the decoded content. The details of LBSM and FDWC are described as
follows.
Our lower bits scramble method
Let us denote the (i, j)th DCT coefficient of the lth table as Sl(i, j), 0 ≤ i, j ≤ 8, l = 1, ...,B,
where B is the total number of tables in the image P. Suppose that, the specified coefficient
Sl(i, j) is selected from the quantized DCT coefficients. We proposed a new LBSM to
control the least significant bits of the DCT coefficient for making the scrambled content
(see Fig. 3(a)). In this method, the lower bits, except for the most significant bit (MSB)
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Fig. 3 Overview of the system (a–c)
of “1” in Sl(i, j), are encoded by the random key to scramble JPEG image. The scrambled
method is described as follows:
Step 1. The encoding key k consists the sequence of kl(i, j) that is generated to scramble
a quantized DCT coefficient Sl(i, j).
Step 2. A shift coefficientm for each Sl(i, j) can be obtained by the following calculation:
m ← 8 − log2(|Sl(i, j)|), (4)
where the symbol . is the floor function meaning “the greatest integer less than or equal
to”. kl(i, j) is shiftedm bits to prepare the encryption key kml (i, j).
kml (i, j) ← kl(i, j)  m. (5)
Step 3. The significant bits of Sl(i, j) are encoded with using kml (i, j) to make scrambled
content C. The scrambled coefficient of C is given by,
S′l(i, j) ← Sl(i, j) ⊕ kml (i, j), (6)
where the symbol ⊕ is the XOR function.
Table 1 shows the positions of the encoded bits in this process. In this table, “∗” denotes
the original bit of quantized DCT coefficient, and “e” denotes the encrypted position bits.
Table 1 Scramble the DCT coefficient
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Thus, Sl(i, j) is substituted by another value, and the quality of P is partially maintained to
make the scrambled content C.
In the scrambledmethod, the scrambled contentC is disclosed as a part of P because the
MSB of Sl(i, j) is not encoded . This method uses the incomplete encoding feature of the
incomplete cryptography. C is widely distributed to users as a trial content via network.
Generation of fragile watermarking key
In order to prepare the decoded key for each user, as shown in Fig. 3(b), T generates a
decryption key k′i by using aUserID : W = {wt , 1 ≤ t ≤ M×M}, then sends it to Ri. Here,
the incomplete decoding feature of incomplete cryptography is used. The generation of
decoded key is described as follows:
Step 1. T extracts wt from userID and embeds it into the least significant bit (LSB) of
key k′i consisting sequence of k′l(i, j) as follows.
k′l(i, j) ←
{
kml (i, j) ⊕ (Sl(i, j) & 0 × 01) (if wt = 0),
kml (i, j) ⊕ (Sl(i, j) & 0 × 01) (if wt = 1),
(7)
where the symbol “&” is the AND function and the symbol Sl(i, j) is NOT function of
Sl(i, j).
Step 2. T prepares watermarked key k′i based on Step 1, and delivers to Ri.
Here, we suppose that the decoded key k′i is safely delivered to Ri by CD, USB, etc.
Our fragile decryption and watermarking combination
After receiving the decoded key, Ri can decode the scrambled content by using the
decoded key k′i . In this process, the scrambled DCT coefficients S′l(i, j) in C are decoded
to close original coefficient with the watermark information that is embedded while the
decoding process (see Fig. 3(c)). We call this process fragile decryption and watermarking
combination (FDWC). The detail of FDWC is explained as follows.
Step 1. Ri extracts the scrambled DCT coefficient S′l(i, j) from C.
Step 2. Ri extracts the corresponding element k′l(i, j) of the decoded key k′i .
Step 3. Each scrambled DCT coefficient of C is decoded as follows:
S′′l (i, j) ← S′l(i, j) ⊕ k′l(i, j). (8)
In FDWC, the user information (userID) is embedded into the LSB of the quantized DCT
coefficient S′′l (i, j) at some particular position of DCT tables.
Table 2 shows the decoded positions bit in this process. The watermarking informa-
tion (userID) is embedded at the position of “w”. This FDWC is the most basic decoded
Table 2 Incomplete decode the DCT coefficient
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processing in the incomplete cryptography. The advantage of incomplete cryptography
is that when decoding the scrambled content C, watermarking information is simulta-
neously embedded into the decoding content. Therefore, it is possible to implement the
watermarked process while decoding.
Additionally, when a producer verifies the legal user of content P, he/she can extract the
user information from the LSB of a particular DCT coefficient by using the secret key ks.
In this paper, ks is the LSB of each DCT coefficient in P′.
According to this proposed method, a producer is possible to verify the legal user of
digital content, so that, he/she can easily manage the copyright of digital contents.
Results and discussion
Experimental environment
All experiments are performed by incomplete encoding and incomplete decoding on the
JPEG image using the Vine Linux 3.2 system. In order to generate the encryption key k, we
use function rand() of GCC version 3.3.21 with seed = 1. Additionally, the ImageMagick
version 6.6.3-02 is used to convert and to view the experimental JPEG images.
Experimental image
We prepare some different features of the experimental images regarding CG, scenery,
construction, and person. Ten test images are the 8-bit RGB images of Standard Image
Data BAse (SIDBA) international standard image (Lighthouse, Pepper, Title, Lenna, Girl,
Airplane, Parrots, Couple, Milkdrop, Mandrill) with size 256 × 256 pixels (Fig. 4(a)). We
use the additional database images ISO/JIS-SCID (Party, Picnic, Portrait) with size 2048×
1536 pixels, 8-bit RGB (Fig. 4(c)). Here, all images are compressed with quality 75 (the
lowest 0 ↔ 100 the highest) to make experimental JPEG images for evaluation of the
proposal method.
Fig. 4 The experimental images (a–c)
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We prepare a bitstream M × M = 32 × 32 pixels of the binary picture (UserID) as
watermarking information (see Fig. 4(b)).
Evaluation of image quality
We use peak signal to noise ratio (PSNR) (Matsui 1998) to evaluate the JPEG image
quality. The PSNR ofM × N pixels images of g(i, j) and g′(i, j) is calculated with








{g(i, j) − g′(i, j)}2
(MSE: Mean Square Error).
In these experiments, the PSNR values are calculated with RGB pixel data of original
image and the JPEG image. A typical value for PSNR in a JPEG image (quality 75) is about
30 dB (Matsui 1998). First, we evaluated the relationship of the subjective image quality
and PSNR. Here, we prepared 10 images with quality of 15–32 dB in PSNR. Those images
were controlled with DCT coefficients of Y and UV component, respectively. After that,
the experimental JPEG images are assessed subjectively with 10 testers and the mean
opinion score (MOS) grade is calculated.
The MOS is an arithmetic mean of all individual scores by tester, and can range from
1 grade (worst) to 5 grade (best). In the experiment, MOS was also reported is perceived
quality of test JPEG images. The MOS values are assigned based on the values shown in
Table 3.
In the MOS experiment, Lenna, Lighthouse, Pepper, and Title are used as test images.
In our MOS test, the test JPEG images are randomly shown to testers. The MOS grades
of each image are decided by each tester.
Figure 5 shows the relation between MOS and PSNR. According to Fig. 5, we realize
that the testers feel the deterioration when PSNR of image is lower than approximately
22 dB (MOS: 0–2.5). In addition, when PSNR is between 22 and 29 dB (MOS: 2.5–3.5), the
testers feel the deterioration but slightly annoying, and the image quality in this case is
considered acceptable for the scrambled content.When PSNR is higher than 29 dB (MOS:
3.5–5), the testers almost could not feel the deterioration of image. We conclude that the
PSNR of the scrambled content is appropriately between 22 and 29 dB, and the PSNR of
the incomplete decoding should be higher than 29 dB.
Results and analysis
This section presents some empirical results concerning of LBSM, FDWC on the JPEG
images. First, the quantized DCT coefficients (position: (i, j), (0 ≤ i ≤ 7, 0 ≤ j ≤ 7))
Table 3MOS grading evaluation
MOS grade Description
5 Deterioration is imperceptible
4 Deterioration is perceptible but not annoying
3 Degradation is slightly annoying
2 Deterioration is annoying
1 Deterioration is very annoying
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Fig. 5 The correspondence of MOS and PSNR
are extracted from the DCT table. Then, the proposed method is applied to a DCT coef-
ficient (0,0) of a Y component (YDCT), a DCT coefficient (0,0) of a UV component
(UVDCT), the low frequency coefficients excluding a DCT coefficient (0,0) of a Y com-
ponent (YADC), low frequency coefficient excluding a DCT coefficient (0,0) of Y and UV
components (ADCT), respectively. The details of these experimental methods are shown
in Fig. 6. Here, the DCT coefficient (0,0) is the most low-frequency coefficient. To restrict
the experimental zone of the DCT coefficient, we use the condition i + j ≤ α (where α is
the zone restriction factor). In this paper, we decide to implement DCT coefficients with
α = 3.
Besides, the DCT quantization tables are also extracted, and its quantized coefficients
are also applied using the proposed method. We recognize that there are many non-
effective quantized coefficients in the Q-table for the high-frequency component. It is
Fig. 6 Experimental DCT domain method
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desirable to target for LBSM and FDWC. Therefore, we decide to encode 4 − (i + j)/2
LSB bits (minimum: 0 bit) of quantized coefficients in Q-table and embed (i+ j)/2 infor-
mation bits (maximum: 8 bits) into each quantized coefficients (WQTB). The details
of these experimental methods are shown in Fig. 7(a). On the other hand, we calcu-
late the number of non-zero DCT coefficients in the whole JPEG image. We encode the
quantized coefficients that has the number of non-zero DCT coefficient below 500, and
embed information into the quantized coefficients that has no non-zero DCT coeffi-
cient frequency (AQTB: Fig. 7(b)). Since the AQTB method embeds the information into
the quantized coefficients that has no non-zero DCT coefficient frequency, the decoded
image (embedded image) is not degraded in the decoding process and all bits of such kind
of quantized coefficients can be substituted by information bits.
Here, we show an example for processing of incomplete cryptography. In order to make
a scrambled content, the quantized DCT coefficient Sl(i, j) is extracted from the DCT
table, the encryption key k is generated to scramble the lower bits except the MSB of bit
“1” in the Sl(i, j). Then, scrambled content C is created by incomplete encoding. When
decoding C, the LSB of S′l(i, j) is substituted by watermarking information (user individ-
ual). Assume that Sl(i, j) = 21; then Sl(i, j) can be expressed as binary bits Sl(i, j) =
101012. As in the scrambled method, we generate an encoded key kl(i, j), and set that as
kl(i, j) = 31(kl(i, j) = 111112) for example. For encoding Sl(i, j), we calculate m = 8−
log2(|21|) = 4 (see formula (4)). m is used to create kml (i, j) = kl(i, j)  m = 31  4;
then, kml (i, j) = 000012. Finally, following (6), S′l(i, j) = Sl(i, j) ⊕ kml (i, j) = 101012 ⊕
000012 = 101002(S′l(i, j) = 20) is scrambled. To illustrate the decoded process, let us
assume the watermark bit as w = 1, then k′l(i, j) = kml (i, j) ⊕ (Sl(i, j) & 0 × 01) =
000012 ⊕ (101012 & 0× 01) = 000012 (see formula (7)). If k′l(i, j) is used to decode S′l(i, j),
we can obtain S′′l (i, j) = S′l(i, j) ⊕ k′l(i, j) = 101002 ⊕ 000012 = 101012. It means that the
watermark bit w = 1 is embedded into LSB of S′′l (i, j). To extract the watermark from the
Fig. 7 a, b Experimental Q-table method
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watermarked JPEG image, it can be extracted from LSB (as the extract key ks) of S′′l (i, j)
and compare with userID to confirm the illegal user.
The experimental results are shown in Fig. 8 and Table 4. We see that the watermarked
JPEG images are not distinguishable from the original JPEG images. The scrambled JPEG
images are degraded about 20 dB, and they seem appropriate as a trial content. We calcu-
late PSNR values of the output JPEG images in every processes and extract the watermark
information (embedded binary data) perfectly from the incomplete decode JPEG images.
In our method, we extract the LSB of quantized DCT coefficients.
Figure 9 is an experimental sample of Girl images. According to the results in Fig. 9, it is
possible to produce the scrambled content (see Fig. 9(c)) and incomplete decoded content
(see Fig. 9(d)) based on the incomplete cryptography. Furthermore, the watermark can be
extract accurately (see Fig. 9(e)). We also compared the results of YDCT and UVDCT as
in Table 4, and confirm that when we adjust the UV component, the image deterioration
was extremely more conspicuous than that applied to the Y component. Therefore, we
can make the scrambled content efficiently with drawing up on the least UV component.
However, because the image deterioration is not conspicuous when implementing the Y
component, it is better to embed the abundant watermark information into the decoded
content for keeping the quality of the decoded image.
Table 4 shows the experimental results using the large size JPEG images (ISO/JIS-SCID).
The scrambled image and watermarked image are created by the proposed method. If the
size of a JPEG image is large, a large amount of watermarking information is embedded
in the image.
Fig. 8 Experimental results of ADCT method (a1–c4)
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Table 4 PSNR [dB] and embedded bits (DCT coefficient)
Method Image P C P′ Emb. [bit] α
YDCT Title 31.84 27.80 31.75 1024 0
Lenna 32.37 26.93 32.32 1024 0
Girl 32.71 26.65 32.63 1024 0
Airplane 30.20 25.16 30.17 1024 0
Parrots 34.25 27.98 34.16 1024 0
Couple 34.06 25.77 33.96 1024 0
Milkdrop 31.94 27.36 31.88 1024 0
Mandrill 24.96 23.57 24.95 1024 0
Lighthouse 32.67 27.59 32.59 1024 0
Pepper 28.81 25.69 28.78 1024 0
Party 35.16 27.85 35.05 49152 0
Picnic 34.39 27.61 34.28 49152 0
Portrait 35.99 27.58 35.86 49152 0
UVDCT Title 31.84 26.72 31.71 512 0
Lenna 32.37 27.48 32.65 512 0
Girl 32.71 24.40 32.57 512 0
Airplane 30.19 24.42 30.12 512 0
Parrots 34.25 24.16 34.03 512 0
Couple 34.06 19.07 33.85 512 0
Milkdrop 31.94 27.51 31.81 512 0
Mandrill 24.96 21.03 24.93 512 0
Lighthouse 32.67 26.68 32.62 512 0
Pepper 28.81 24.78 28.73 512 0
Party 35.16 16.87 34.91 24576 0
Picnic 34.39 20.39 34.17 24576 0
Portrait 35.99 15.47 35.69 24576 0
YUVD Title 31.84 26.80 31.74 1536 0
Lenna 32.37 24.11 32.19 1536 0
Girl 32.71 23.01 32.49 1536 0
Airplane 30.20 22.19 30.09 1536 0
Parrots 34.25 22.93 33.92 1536 0
Couple 34.06 17.72 33.75 1536 0
Milkdrop 31.94 24.65 31.75 1536 0
Mandrill 24.96 20.35 24.92 1536 0
Lighthouse 32.67 27.58 32.60 1536 0
Pepper 28.81 23.75 28.71 1536 0
Party 35.16 16.56 34.82 73728 0
Picnic 34.39 19.19 34.05 73728 0
Portrait 35.99 15.17 35. 73728 0
YADC Title 31.84 28.33 31.60 4592 3
Lenna 32.37 28.52 32.19 5156 3
Girl 32.71 26.94 32.49 4975 3
Airplane 30.20 26.09 30.11 4973 3
Parrots 34.25 29.74 33.93 4872 3
Couple 34.06 25.69 33.76 4756 3
Milkdrop 31.94 27.69 31.72 4819 3
Mandrill 24.96 24.40 24.92 5738 3
Lighthouse 32.67 27.99 32.44 4935 3
Pepper 28.81 26.70 28.72 5397 3
Party 35.16 28.32 34.83 172976 3
Picnic 34.39 27.94 34.08 211230 3
Portrait 35.99 28.19 35.67 183472 3
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Table 4 PSNR [dB] and embedded bits (DCT coefficient) (Continued)
ADCT Title 31.84 28.33 31.60 4592 3
Lenna 32.37 27.03 31.54 7015 3
Girl 32.71 26.79 31.88 6507 3
Airplane 30.20 25.99 29.77 6404 3
Parrots 34.25 28.26 32.96 6702 3
Couple 34.06 25.65 33.11 6082 3
Milkdrop 31.94 25.29 31.14 6543 3
Mandrill 24.96 23.96 24.76 7920 3
Lighthouse 32.67 27.99 32.44 4935 3
Pepper 28.81 25.26 28.34 7716 3
Party 35.16 27.97 34.18 220517 3
Picnic 34.39 27.35 33.33 273189 3
Portrait 35.99 28.01 35.96 183472 3
Moreover, the experimental results of DCT Q-table are also shown in Fig. 10 and
Table 5. From these results, we recognize that it is equivalent to DCT coefficient methods.
It means that, it is possible to produce the scrambled content and incomplete decod-
ing content. Especially, AQTB method can provide the non-degraded content which is
embedded about 400 bits information. In other words, DCT quantization method can
control the quality of content with low computation cost. On the other hand, DCT
quantization table methods have a capacity lower than that of DCT coefficient methods.
Fig. 9 a–e Examples of girl images (ADCT)
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Fig. 10 Experimental results of WQBT method (a1–c4)
According to the above results, we have established the incomplete cryptography sys-
tem based on the proposed method. Scrambled content is created to disclose the original
content and distributed widely to users by using LBSM. In FDWC, we change the quan-
tized DCT coefficient itself instead of the LSB of quantized DCT coefficient by a devised
decryption key. Thus, the original content is not decoded temporarily inside the system.
Thus, we conclude that the above technical problem by the conventional DRM system is
solved by using the incomplete cryptography system.
Comparison of our proposedmethod with related work
According to analytics of related works, JFD seems to be promising to achieve decryp-
tion and fingerprint embedding at the same time. However, since un-decrypted parts in
JFD are employed as fingerprinting information for user, then the quality of the decrypted
content is limited. Our method uses the userID that is embedded into the specified
position; therefore, our method can flexibly control the quality of decrypted content. In
addition, in our method, the incompletely decrypted blocks (watermarked blocks) are
used instead of un-decrypted blocks; therefore, our method can take better trade-off
between multimedia security and fingerprinting imperceptibility than JFD . The detail of
comparison of our method with JFD is shown in Table 6.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented a scheme of an incomplete cryptography system and
proposed the digital content distribution system based on incomplete cryptography. This
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Table 5 PSNR [dB] and embedded bits (quantization table)
Method Image P C P′ Emb. [bit] α
WQTB Title 31.84 13.18 28.99 416 0
Lenna 32.37 17.49 31.72 416 0
Girl 32.71 17.98 32.48 416 0
Airplane 30.20 14.95 29.66 416 0
Parrots 34.25 17.34 33.64 416 0
Couple 34.06 19.78 33.76 416 0
Milkdrop 31.94 27.36 31.88 1024 0
Mandrill 24.96 23.57 24.95 1024 0
Lighthouse 32.67 16.45 31.52 416 0
Pepper 28.81 17.08 28.52 416 0
Party 35.16 27.85 35.05 49152 0
Picnic 34.39 27.61 34.28 49152 0
Portrait 35.99 27.58 35.86 49152 0
AQTB Title 31.84 15.52 31.84 512 0
Lenna 32.37 14.85 32.37 416 0
Girl 32.71 23.10 32.71 424 0
Airplane 30.20 19.61 30.20 336 0
Parrots 34.25 20.31 34.25 344 0
Couple 34.06 23.54 34.06 464 0
Milkdrop 31.94 27.51 31.81 512 0
Mandrill 24.96 21.03 24.93 512 0
Lighthouse 32.67 18.27 32.67 512 0
Pepper 28.81 17.40 28.81 344 0
Party 35.16 16.87 34.91 24576 0
Picnic 34.39 20.39 34.17 24576 0
Portrait 35.99 15.47 35.69 24576 0
approach integrates the encoding process and watermarking progress of DRM technol-
ogy. By doing so, we can eliminate the problem of the present DRM technology and
manage the legal user effectively.
One of the lessons learned from this paper is that in order to make the scrambled image
and the incomplete decoded image for JPEG, it is possible to process the Y component
and UV component flexibly. Also, another lesson is that we can control the incomplete
decoded image quality using a specialized key individually. Subsequently, the watermark
information is correctly extracted from the watermarked image by using this approach.
The watermarked images are in good visual quality and have high PSNR values. The effec-
tiveness of the proposed scheme has been demonstrated with the aid of experimental
results.
Therefore, we conclude that the proposed method is useful for the rights management
technology in illegal content distribution via network.
Table 6 Comparison between our proposed method with JFD
Proposed method JFD (Karthik and Hatzinakos 2007)
Domain Partial encryption/decryption Partial encryption/decryption
Block Incompletely/completely decryption Un-decrypted/decrypted
Coefficient Watermarked Un-decrypted/decrypted
Fingerprint UserID Un-decrypted part
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